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Abstract

This study has two chapters. The first uses Ray Fair 's national economic voting model of
U.S. presidential elections to pose and answer specific questions about how voting theory
works in practice. The results suggest that economic activity in the year of an election is
the primary determinant of voters ' perceptions of presidential performance on the
economy, while earlier years in the administration 's term are not important. Also , voters
hold the incumbent party responsible for economic conditions whether or not that party
controls Congress. Finally, the results suggest that economic voting generally operates
symmetrically - a fall in growth affects the vote as much as an increase in growth does.
In the second chapter, a pooled, cross-sectional forecasting model is developed to explain
state vote shares in presidential elections from 1972 through 2004. The model takes into
account state and national economic conditions and election year political variables. It
also controls for states' partisan predispositions in order to produce a forecast using data
available prior to the election. The model correctly predicts 88 percent of state results and
has an average error of 2.9 percentage points of the state vote.
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Introduction
"Next Tuesday all of you will go to the polls, will stand there in the polling place
and make a decision. I think when you make that decision, it might be well if you
would ask yourself, are you better off than you were four years ago? Is it easier
for you to go and buy things in the stores than it was four years ago? Is there more
or less unemployment in the country than there was four years ago? ... And if you
answer all of those questions yes, why then, I think your choice is very obvious as
to whom you will vote for. If you don't agree, if you don't think that this course
that we've been on for the last four years is what you would like to see us follow
for the next four, then I could suggest another choice that you have." - Ronald
Reagan, at the Carter-Reagan Presidential Debate, October 28, 1980.

At the 1980 Reagan-Carter Presidential debate, Governor Ronald Reagan asked
the American people to engage in a practice that economists and political scientists had
long recognized, but at the time had only begun to fully understand - economic voting.
Reagan's hope was that the public would vote based on the economy's poor performance
over the previous four years. Their vote would be a referendum on the prevailing
economic conditions under President Carter, regardless of the extent to which he was or
was not responsible for those conditions. In a period of high unemployment, stagnant
growth, and soaring energy prices, voters concerned with the economy seemed unlikely
to back the incumbent. In November, Reagan won in an Electoral College landslide,
capturing 489 electoral votes and 50.75 percent of the popular vote to Carter's 49
electoral votes and 41 percent popular vote share.
The 1980 US Presidential election illustrates the essential framework behind
economic voting theory: voters reward incumbents for the economy when it performs
well and punish them when it stumbles. There are several strains of this literature. Some
focus on forecasting elections using polling data and political variables in addition to
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economic measures, while others attempt to explain the votes of individuals using survey
data that measure personal finances and political attitudes. The basic theory considered in
this study , however, was popularized by Ray Fair, whose work focuses chiefly on using
economic aggregates to explain the vote share of incumbent political parties based on
macroeconomic performance.
Several assumptions deserve explanation. For one , the theory assumes that voters
consider only the performance of the economy under the incumbent party or candidate.
Earlier models, such as Fair's seminal 1978 work, sought to test whether voters also took
into account the performance of the opposing party during previous turns in office. Fair
concluded, though, that voters focus solely on the performance of the economy under the
incumbent party over the most recent term. Contemporary work on the subject
unfailingly assumes this to be the case. The Fair model and its variants also assume that
voters' evaluations of the economy are retrospective and based on macroeconomic
performance under the current term of the incumbent party, not on prospective
evaluations of how the candidates might perform in the future . Though survey-level
studies and equations using indexes of business expectations have sought to determine
the role of expectations in elections, papers using economic aggregates focus on the role
of past performance (Brooks and Prysby 1999, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 200 I).
Finally, Fair's work and other similar studies predict that voters will hold the
incumbent party responsible for economic conditions preceding an election. This is
particularly important for United States presidential elections, where there is often not an
incumbent candidate running for election. Despite the absence of an incumbent
candidate, economic voting theory predicts that voters will punish or reward the
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successor candidate of the incumbent party for the conditions of the economy. Most of
this work additionally accounts for the independent effect of incumbency by including a
variable that indicates whether or not an incumbent candidate is running, but the theories
suggest that the incumbent party's candidate is still evaluated on the basis of the
economy's performance under the outgoing President.
The literature on economic voting is broad and deep, with an estimated 300
articles and books published on the subject as of 1998 (Lewis-Beck and Steigmaier
2000). In the United States, though, researchers have focused primarily on national
presidential elections. Political scientists and economists have spent much less time
explaining the results of the presidential vote by state. The inadequate attention paid to
state outcomes is an important omission. For one , Presidents are not elected on the basis
of the nation al popular vote . In a close race, the winner of the popular vote can very well
lose the election. As recently as 2000, Vice President Al Gore won the popular vote over
George W. Bush by a margin of 48.38% to 47.87%, but lost the electoral vote and , thus,
the election. Conversely, a swing ofjust over 100,000 votes in Ohio away from President
Bush in 2004 would have given the election to Senator John Kerry , who lost the popular
vote by 2.5 percentage points. Furthermore, the estimation of state-level equations allows
for a comparison of the relative strength of national and state economic conditions on the
vote for President. Do voters take a broad view of the President's role in managing the
national economy, or do they vote on the perception of more local conditions? Finally, a
state model allows for a closer examination of the factors that ultimately determine voter
choice. A national model aggregates the results of the regions and states, and thus
overlooks some of the more fundamental, long-term factors, such as partisan and
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ideological affiliation, that determine election outcomes. Explaining (and forecasting)
state results requires a more detailed examination of these factors, and this analysis can
result in a better understanding of what determines election winners.
Even at the national level, questions remain about how exactly voters turn their
perceptions of economic performance into presidential votes . One of the more disputed
elements in this literature concerns the length of time over which voters evaluate the
economy. While there is no doubt that the rate of growth of real economic activity factors
into voter choice, for example, it is less apparent over what time period this growth
matters for elections. In addition, the political context of economic voting may also be
important. The American political system is not like parliamentary systems of countries
such as Britain, where governing coalitions have near complete control over the tools of
fiscal policy. In the United States, the extent to which Presidents affect economic policy
depends critically on how many allies they have in Congress. It is not clear whether
voters recognize this and cast their ballots accordingly , by assigning less responsibility
for economic conditions to a President not backed a by unified legislature. Finally, there
is no reason to assume (as most of the literature implicitly does) that economic voters
reward incumbents for good economic performance to the same extent that they punish
them for poor performance. That is, economic voting may be asymmetrical. A given
increase in economic activity may lead to a change in the incumbent vote of a different
magnitude than an equal reduction in economic activit y would. These issues are obstacles
to a more complete understanding of vote theory.
Fair's influential model , originally developed in 1978 but refined in 1996, is used
to address these uncertainties. There are two sections. After a discussion of Fair's model,
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a series of alternative specifications are estimated to examine specific topics in national
economic voting theory. This section seeks to shed light on some of the specific gaps in
the understanding of economic voting. It tests the time horizon of economic voting by
examining the effect of growth and inflation in separate years leading up to the election 
we expect to find economic events to be less important the farther in advance of the
election that they occur, but it is unclear just how far back they matter. The role of
political context is assessed by controlling for the number of Houses of Congress held by
the President's party, and then interacting this control with the economic variables in
Fair's model. It may be that voters assign less responsibility for economic conditions to a
President working under divided government than they to do to one with a friendly
legislature. We then investigate the possible asymmetrical effect of economic variables
on vote share by creating separate variables for increases and decreases in economic
activity and examining whether the magnitude of their effects are equivalent. These
models should provide some insight into these unresolved questions in the economic
voting literature.
The second section draws on the basic theory articulated in the first to create a
standalone forecasting model to predict state votes for president. Why forecast?
Rosenstone (1983) puts it best.
"Who will be the next president?" is an important question ... not only because it
is interesting in its own right, but because of what the question requires of us
when we try to answer it. The question demands a response that we are currently
ill equipped to provide. To wrestle with it we are forced to formulate theories that
generalize beyond a single election and are sufficiently complete to explain as
well as predict. The answer is not nearly as important as what the answering
process leads us to think about. To a large degree, forecasting presidential
contests is merely a convenient vehicle for the more important question: What
determines election outcomes?
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This is an important question for political scientists and economists, and the empirical
estimation of such a model yields insight into the relative importance of the myriad of
factors that go into voters' decisions, particularly at the state level , where the model must
quantify and control for variation across both space and time (Holbrook 1991). A pooled
cross-sectional model must account for spatial variation in political ideology and
partisanship, and also must measure how these factors change over the years within a
state or region. Furthermore, it must weight the relative importance of national and local
factors, such as national and state economic conditions, and must control for the presence
of special factors in a given state in a given year , like the advantage candidates receive
from running in their home states. Drawing on the foundation laid by Rosenstone (1983),
Campbell (1992, 2006), Holbrook (199 I), and Strumpf and Phillippe (1999), the
theoretical underpinnings of such a model are discussed, developed, and then tested
empirically. The forecasting accuracy of the model is evaluated using its historical
absolute percent error, and by conducting ex-post forecasts of the 1996, 2000 , and 2004
presidential elections.

Chapter 1 -Topics in National Economic Voting
I. Literature Review - Fair

Ray Fair's 1978 article , "The "Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President,"
has become the basis for much of economic voting theory.
The theory of voting behavior that is most consistent with standard economic
theory states that a voter evaluates the current pronouncements and past
performances of the competing parties, forms from this evaluation an expectation
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of his or her future utility under the party , and votes for the party that provides the
maximum expected future utility. I
After laying out a set of assumptions that have since become standard in this field ,2 Fair
specifies and estimates his model. His dependent variable is the incumbent party 's share
of the two party vote . In excluding third party votes from the dependent variable, Fair
sets a precedent that has since become nearly uniform in papers on economic voting. Fair
argues that third parties have rarely played important roles in presidential elections, so
their exclusion generally has little effect on the vote equation (with the recent and notable
exception of Ross Perot in 1992 and 1996) (Fair 2006). Furthermore, third-party
candidates rarely take their votes systematically from other candidates. Though it has
been often-stated that Ross Perot took votes only from Republican candidates, exit poll
data suggest that Perot took roughly equal amounts from both Clinton and Bush.
Except for the 1924 election, where the votes for Davis and Lafollette have been
added together and counted as Democratic, no adjustments have been made in my
work for third-party votes: V is the Democratic share of the two-party vote. By
not making an adjustment, it is implicitly assumed that the percentage of the third
party votes taken from the Democrats is the same as the Democratic share of the
two-party vote (Fair 1996).
Other papers offer additional explanations for this treatment of the dependent variable.
For Campbell ( 1992), "Given that third-party votes can be drawn from either party's
supporters in any given election and that the emergence of significant third-party
candidates in elections is sporadic, it would be extremely cumbersome to attempt to
predict generally the strength of third-party candidates in presidential elections"

As suggested previously, Fair investigates whether or not voters consider the performance of the
non-incumbent party in the most recent turns they had in office, but he finds that th is does not
have a significant effect on vote share.
2 For example. that of aggregation, which states the coefficients are the same for all voters , who
use the same measures to assess performance. The others are statistical assumptions (e.g. any
differences in voters are evenly distributed across elections).

1
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(Campbell 1992). Eisenberg and Ketcham also cite the low statistical power of their
model to pick up third-party candidates (2004). Fundamentally, though, these
explanations support a basic theoretical proposition. In the United States political system,
only the candidates from the two major parties have a chance to win the Presidency.
Thus, if voters wish to punish the incumbent party for economic malaise, they will do so
by voting for the party with a legitimate chance to wrest control over fiscal policy from
the incumbent. Third-party candidates garner sporadic support and often campaign on
narrow issues, and are thus not in a position to be the channel through which voters
express their displeasure over the performance of the economy.
The two-party vote , then, is regressed on two general types of variables 
economic variables and incumbency variables. The economic variables are the backbone
of the model. In his 1978 specification, Fair uses measures for inflation and for real
economic activity to explain the incumbent's share of the two-party vote . The difficulty
lies in how precisely to define these variables. He acknowledges that there is little
economic theory to suggest whether voters look more at the level of economic activity or
its change, nor is it clear which part of each four year period voters consider when
making their decision, as suggested above. Similarly, it is not immediately apparent
whether unemployment or growth rates matter more in determining vote share. These
questions, then, are ultimately empirical ones. By examining the fit of the equation with
slightly different specifications, Fair eventually includes the annualized rate of real per
capita GDP growth (GROWTH) for the year of the election, and the absolute value of the
growth rate of the GDP deflator (INFLATION) in the two year period preceding the
election. Though these variables undergo subtle revisions in later papers, (growth is now
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measured by the first three quarters of the election year, and the GOP deflator is
considered for the full fifteen quarters before the election), the principle behind their
inclusion remains the same.
One major update to the original model was the addition of the GOODNEWS
variable in 1996. Before the 1992 election, the equation predicted that voters would not
punish the incumbent, George H.W. Bush, for the economy's performance. With a low
inflation rate and growth in the first quarter of 1995 at 1.5%, well above recession values,
the model failed to anticipate voters' backlash against the President for his performance
on the economy. As specified, the equation did not pick up the sentiment expressed in
consumer confidence and voter opinion polls , which showed that individuals were
pessimistic about the state of the economy (Fair 1996). These sentiments appeared to
affect election returns - despite the predictions of the model, the Democratic challenger,
Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas, won the election with 53.5% of the two party vote .
To capture the voters' pessimism, Fair added the GOODNEWS variable to his model.
As I lived through the 1989-1992 period, it struck me that there was no quarter
within the overall fifteen-quarter period before the 1992 election in which the
economic news was good in terms of a high growth rate. The news was either just
okay or bad, as during the 1990-1991 recession. Most other fifteen-quarter
periods seemed to have at least some quarters of good news even if the overall
period was not good. Maybe by the end of 1991 the lack of good news for at least
three years began to wear on people and thus led to their gloom (Fair 1996).
In his 1996 update, Fair defined a quarter of good news as one in which the annualized
rate of real per capita GDP growth reached or exceeded 2.9% - theory did not suggest a
specific value, but empirically, this measure provided the best fit. This value was later
changed to 3.2%, but for either number, the principle remained the same: Voters
remember these exceptional quarters, and reward the incumbent party for them (Fair
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2002). Indeed, at the 2.9% threshold level, the Bush administration was the only
administration in a sample going back to 1880 with no quarters of good news . The
inclusion of GOODNEWS significantly improves the performance of the model, and
reduces the error of the 1992 prediction.
The other variables in Fair's model are political and designed to control for the
independent effect of non-economic factors on election results. PERSON accounts for
"the case that an incumbent running for election has advantages over his opponents that
are not reflected in the [economic] variables" (Fair 1978). (PERSON = I when the
incumbent is running for reelection). These advantages may include such factors as a
proven vote-winning ability and the advantage of having the bully pulpit and reputation
that comes with occupying the Oval Office. However, should a party remain in power for
too long, voters may grow tired of it and become less likely to support its candidate. Such
is the theory behind the DURA TION variable, which accounts for the likelihood that, all
else equal, voters will increasingly turn against a party the longer it stays in office. The
last political variable that Fair includes in his model is the WAR variable. WAR, equal to
I in 1918, 1944, and 1948, and 0 in all other years, accounts for the fact that the fifteen
quarter-periods prior to these elections were dominated by news of the World Wars . Fair
suggests that "these periods may differ in kind from the other periods. To control for this,
the assumption was made that the coefficients for INFLATION and GOODNEWS are zero
for these three elections" (Fair 1996). Voters were still concerned with GROWTH, but the
World Wars dominated the news to such an extent that voters did not take INFLATION or
GOODNEWS into account when casting their ballot. Fair never explicitly describes why

elections during the Korean War, Vietnam, and today's Iraq War are not accounted for by
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WA R, but, based on the above explanation, these wars are not considered to have
dominated the news to such an extent that voters no longer considered the inflation rate
or good news in making their choice - it's a question of magnitude. Fair adds that this
specific treatment of the WAR variable led to the best fit (Fair 2002). Unreported
regression results examining this assertion support Fair's claim. It seems that only the
. World Wars dominated the minds of the electorate to such a great extent that economic
voting became unimportant.
The Fair model has had considerable success in predicting the two-party vote
share. The most recent model, estimated through 2004, has a standard error of 2.5
percentage points and an R2 of 0.905. Furthermore, its parsimony and flexibility allow it
to serve as the basis for tests on some of the unresolved issues in economic voting. Table
1.1 shows Fair's results from the 1916 to 2004 elections. 3
An interpretation of Fair's results, and a comparison of his results with the figures
obtained using revised data, will clarify the anal ysis in later sections." The political
control variables, PARTY, PERSON, DURATION, and WAR are all significant in Fair's
model. The coefficient of -2.68 on PARTY indicates that, all else fixed, a Democratic
candidate can expect to receive a smaller share of the two party vote than a Republican
candidate can (PARTY = 1 when Democrats control the White House and - 1 when the
Republicans do). PERSON is positive as expected, and reflects the advantage enjoyed by
incumbents running for reelection; the incumbent party should fare better by 3.3

Fair's equation was re-estimated using obtained and transformed data for the purpose of this
paper, since Fair's own data set does not include lagged values for growth in real per capita GDP
or changes in the deflator. The sources and methods of transformation for the data are detailed in
the appendix at the end of the paper. Table 1.1 shows the coefficients of Fair's most recent
model estimated with both the original data and the new values. The only variables that seem to
change appreciably are PERSON and WAR.
4 Refer to Append ix A for a full defin ition of all of Fair's variables .
3
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Table 1.1 The Fair Model.
Fair's Data

Revised Data

Variable

t-statistic

Variable

t-statistic

Intercept

47.26
( 18.62)***

Intercept

50.12
(20.05)***

Party

-2.68
(4 .27)***

Party

-2.48
(-4.72)***

Person

3.3
(2.34)**

Person

1.66
-1.32

Duration

-3.33
(2.75)**

Duration

-4.53
(-3.97)***

War

5.61
(2.09)**

War

13.44
(5.01 )***

Growth

0.68
(6 .14)***

Growth

0.52
(4.62)***

Inflation

-0.657
(-2.27)**

Inflation

-0.83
(-3.51)***

GoodNews

1.075
(4 .31)***

GoodNews

1.04
(4.89)***

2

0.905
2.54
Se
23
N
*** denotes significance at J% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
* denotes significance at 10% level
R

R

2

Se
N

0.93
2.17
23

percentage points in the national two party vote when their candidate is running for
reelection, as opposed to when they have nominated a new candidate. The coefficient for
DURATION is negative, which indicates that the longer a party stays in the White House,

the greater voter fatigue becomes with that party, and the more difficult it becomes for
them to win support, ceteris paribus. WAR is also positive. During the elections of 1920,
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1944, and 1948, when WAR was equal to 1 and INFLA TION and GOODNEWS were
equal to 0, voters may have "rallied around the flag" and been more likely to support the
incumbent party. The economic variables - GROWTH, INFLA TION, and GOODNEWS
act as expected. Increases in the annual rate of growth of real per capita GDP in the three
quarters preceding the election lead to increases in incumbent vote share. Increases in the
rate of inflation, on the other hand, hurt the incumbent vote share. More quarters of
GOODNEWS help the incumbent.

A new regression with revised data mostly yields similar results. The parameter
estimates and significance of PARTY, DURATION, GROWTH, INFLATION, and
GOODNEWS do not change substantially in the new regression. Only the new results for
PERSON and WAR stand out as noticeably different from Fair's work. PERSON, while it

remains positive, loses significance in the new regression. Conversely, the parameter
estimate for WAR increases substantially, and it becomes more significant. These changes
should not be of major concern, however, for the purposes of this paper. As Fair suggests,
his model may be overparameterized (especially for a sample of23), and thus sensitive to
slight changes in the data. This is especially true with the WAR variable. WAR is equal to
I only three times, so it is not surprising that it could change substantially in response to
minor changes in the data. PERSON is equal to 1 in fifteen observations, so its sensitivity
is more surprising, but still not cause for concern. Since the tests that follow do not
depend specifically on these variables, the analysis should not suffer as a result.
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II. Extensions of the Fair Model

What is the Relevant Time Horizon/or Economic Voting?
Despite Reagan 's call for voters to ask whether or not they were better off in 1980
four years before, the economic voting literature has not satisfactorily resolved the
question of how long voters look back in making a decision. Does performance matter
over the entire term, or is it only more recent trends? Theory suggests that economic
fluctuations closer to Election Day should be more important than what happens at the
beginning of an administration, but it is unclear just where the line should be drawn. Fair
hypothesizes that voters discount their measure of the incumbent party 's performance
such that earlier years are less important, but the magnitude of this discount factor is
unknown (1978). Furthermore, his specification suggests that the relevant time horizons
differ by variable - GROWTH is defined as the annualized rate of growth of real per
capita GOP for the first three quarters of the election year, whereas INFLATION takes
into account changes in the price level over the administration 's entire term. No
explanation is given for this choice beyond indicating that these measures provided the
best fit. Other papers use variables with an even shorter time frame, such as the change in
real second quarter GNP in the election year (Campbell 1992), or unemployment at the
time of the election (Strumpf and Phillipe 1999).
To examine the relevant time horizon for economic voting, equations are
estimated with lagged values for growth and inflation. Fair 's GOODNEWS is also
separated into four discrete variables, which indicate the number of quarters where

16

growth was over 3.2% for each of the administration's four years in office. If voters look
back more than just a year, these parameters should be significant, although we would
expect the value of their coefficients to decrease the farther back they are from November
of the election year. Specifically, the variables are defined as follows:"

GROWTH4 = growth rate of real per capita GOP in the first three quarters of
the election year (annual rate).
GROWTH] = growth rate of real per capita GOP in the incumbent
administration 's third year.
GROWTH} = growth rate of real per capita GOP in the incumbent
administration's second year.
GROWTH j = growth rate of real per capita GOP in the incumbent
administration's first year.
GOODNEWS4 = number of quarters in the election year in which the growth
rate of real per capita GOP exceeded 3.2% at an annual rate.
GOODNEWS] = number of quarters in the administration's third year in
which the growth rate of real per capita GOP exceeded 3.2% at an annual rate.
GOODNEWS} = number of quarters in the administration 's second year in
which the growth rate of real per capita GOP exceeded 3.2% at an annual rate.
GOODNEWS j = number of quarters in the administration 's first year in
which the growth rate of real per capita GOP exceeded 3.2% at an annual rate.
INFLA TION] and 4 = absolute value of the growth rate of the GOP deflator in
the last seven quarters of the administration (annual rate).
INFLA TION} = absolute value of the growth rate of the GOP deflator in the
second year of the administration.
INFLATION j = absolute value of the growth rate of the GOP deflator in the
second year of the administration.
Table 1.2 displays the results.
The results of the test on GROWTH are fairly striking. An increase in the growth rate of
real per capita GOP of one percentage point in the three quarters immediately preceding
the election leads to a O.627.percentage point increase in the incumbent party's share of
the two party vote. Furthermore, only growth in the year of the election appears to have
an effect on the vote; growth rates from previous years are statistically insignificant.
For the new versions of GOODNEWS and INFLATION, the values are still set to zero in 1920,
1944, and 1948, because WAR = 1.

5
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Table 1.2 - The Time Horizon of Economic Voting
Lags of GROWTH

Lag of GOODNEWS

Lags of INFLA TION

Variable

t-statistic

Variable

t-statistic

Variable

t-st atistic

Intercept

47.336
(17.53)**

Intercept

46.939
(16.38)***

Intercept

44.86
(16 .89)** *

Party

-2.592
(
3.86)***

Party

-2 .565

Party

-3 .15

Person

3.035
( 1.83)*

Person

3.471
(2.20)* *

Person

2.804
( 1.88)*

Duration

-3.4 19
(-2.62)**

Duration

-2 .891
(-2 .06)*

Duration

-3 .16
(-2.50)**

War

6.61
(2 . J 3)*

War

5.104
-1 .64

War

8.774
(2.65 )**

Inflation

-0 .806
(-2.43)**

Inflation

-0.629
(-1.72)

Growth

0.82
(6 .68)***

GoodNews

1.19
(4.11)***

Growth

0.629
(4.41 )***

GoodNews

1.405
(4 .35)***

Growth,

0.628

Goodnews,

1.7

and 4

(3 .38)***

(-4.49)***

Inflation]
( 1.39)t

(4 .06)***
Growth]

0.088

Goodnews]

-0.155

Goodnews,

RZ

0.077
(-0 .60)

Goodnews ,

0.932

0.908
-1.3

Inflation,

-0.688
(-1.74)

Inflation,

-0.172
(-0.65)

RZ

RZ

0.85
Adjusted
SE
2.67
13.12
F
F
*** denotes significance at I% level
** denotes significance at 5% level

Adjusted
SE

0.955

( 1.54)t

(- 1.24)

Growth,

-1.12

(1.5I)t

-0.48
Growth,

0.193

0.83
2 .78
11.98

Adju sted
SE
F

0.92
2.51
16.56
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* denotes significance at 10% level
t denotes significance at 10% level in one-tailed test

It seems that voters look exclusively to the year of the election when considering
fluctuations in the business cycle.

It does not seem to be the case, however, that voters look exclusively to the year
of the election when evaluating the overall performance of the economy. The

GOODNEWS variable is designed to capture the positive effect on vote share that
especially strong quarters give the incumbent party. The regression results confirm Fair's
hypothesis that voters remember especially strong quarters, and suggest weakly that when
these quarters occur does not matter. GOODNEWS in the year of the election and the two
years prior have coefficients of the hypothesized sign and are significant in one-tailed
tests at the 10% level. Tests of linear equivalence among the four coefficients of the
lagged GOODNEWS variables are insufficient to reject the null hypothesis that those
coefficients are equal to each other. Although the regression's inability to reject these
results may be symptomatic of the limited sample size , it nonetheless leaves us with the
conclusion that good quarters matter, whenever they occur in the election cycle.
Particularly since the coefficients for GOODNEWS are statistically equivalent over time ,

GOODNEWS, then, is likely best captured by a single variable.
The INFLA TlON results proved difficult to interpret. Unreported regression
results for different specifications produced ambiguous results, so Fair's original
specification from his 1978 model was used. This specification takes into account the
annualized rate of inflation for the last two years of the administration. Variables were
then added for the first and second years of the administration. The results suggest that
Fair has found the appropriate specification in his 1992 update by using price level
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growth over the entire administration, as none of the coefficients on lags for individual
periods is significant. Instead, it seems that voters are interested in broad changes in price
levels, and will not notice fluctuations from year to year enough for their votes to be
influenced. It is also possible that this lack of significance over individual periods may be
explained by the Phillips Curve relationship - increased inflation in the short run may be
accompanied by lower unemployment and greater GDP growth. Though these variables
cannot be added to Fair's model due to their high correlation with other variables in the
model, it seems a reasonable hypothesis to suggest that increases in GDP growth or
reductions in unemployment may be correlated with increased votes for incumbents that
may counteract the adverse effect of inflation on incumbent vote share. However, in the
medium run (perhaps over a span of four years), unemployment returns to the natural
rate, and the ills of inflation take their tolls on incumbents. Conversely, it is not surprising
that GROWTH is important in the short run, since the variable reflects changes in real
economic activity for the average individual that should be felt immediately. Fluctuations
in earlier years of an administration become unimportant in comparison.

Does Divided Government Reduce the Effect ofEconomic Voting?
Often brushed aside in both presidential campaigns and literature on economic
voting is the fact that presidents are not the only economic policymakers at the national
level. Even apart from the role played by the Federal Reserve, the president has relatively
little sway over economic policy in the face of an uncooperative Congress. Trade
agreements, tax policy, and government spending of all types require Congressional
authorization. Without a Congressional majority, a president may find it difficult to
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implement a policy agenda, whereas a president whose party controls both houses of
Congress should find more success in pushing through an economic program.
The question, then, is whether or not voters factor this into their choice for
President. As Nadeau and Beck write,
Our expectation is that as partisan unity of government increases, economic
voting will increase. Voters, to the extent they observe the president has partisan
control, are less hesitant to attribute to him or her responsibility for economic
management. They reason that he or she has the power to get programs through
Congress and so reward or punish subsequent economic performance heavily at
the ballot box (200 I).
The incumbent party , then , should be held more responsible for the performance of the
economy the more Houses of Congress it controls, since voters will recognize that the
party bears greater responsibility for economic results as its level of control increases. To
test this hypothesis, the variable DIVIDED is created. It measures whether the incumbent
party in the White House controls 0, I, or 2 Houses of Congress at the time. DIVIDED

owhen the President's party has a majority in neither House of Congress,

=

I when it has

majority in either the House or the Senate, and 2 if his party has a majority in both. We
then interact this variable with GROWTH and GOODNEWS. The coefficients on these
variables should be positive. An increase in GROWTH or GOODNEWS, when the
President's party controls both houses of Congress, should lead to a greater increase in
vote share than when government is divided.
The regression results in Table 1.3 suggest that the voters do not hold incumbent
parties any more responsible for economic conditions when the President's party also
controls Congress than when it does not.

21

Table 1.3 - Tests for the Effect of Divided Government.
GROWTH Test

GROWTH and GOODNEWS Test

Vari able

t-statistic

Variable

t-statistic

Intercept

47.362
( 18.28)***

Intercept

46 .511
(16 .69)***

Party

-2.615
(-4.05)***

Party

-2.4 74
(-3 .69)***

Person

3.38
(2.34)**

Person

3.67
(2.46)**

Du rat ion

-3.302
(-2 .67)**

Duration

-3 .27
(-2 .63)* *

War

5 .639
(2.06)*

War

6.03
(2 .15)**

Gr owth

0.724
(5.53)***

Growth

0 .712
(5.38)***

Growth*Div ided

-0.077
(-0 .66)

Growth*Divided

-0.05
(-0.41)

Inflation

-0.708

Goodnews*Divided

-0. 119

(-2.31)**
GoodNews

1.104

(-0 .878)
Inflation

(4.28)***

-0 .707
(-2 .29)**

Goodnews

1.35
(3 .52)***

R2 Adjusted
Sf:
F

0 .85
2.58
17.3

23
N
*** denotes sign ificance at I% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
* denotes sign ificance at 10% level

R2 Adjusted
Sf:
F

0.86
2.51
15.2

N

23
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Unreported results with slightly different definitions of DIVIDED support these findings."
These results are consistent with the work of Eisenberg and Ketcham (2004), Nadeau and
Lewis-Beck (2001), and (Norpoth 2001), all of whom also find that the partisan
composition of the legislature has no significant effect on votes for President. Rightly or
wrongly, economic voters appear to focus solely on the President - the extent to which
the President is supported by Congress appears not to factor in to voters' decisions.

Is Economic Voting Asymmetrical?
Most of the literature on economic voting implicitly assumes that economic
voting is symmetrical. Under this assumption, an increase in real per capita GOP of a
given magnitude will increase the incumbent party's vote share by the same amount that
an identical decrease in economic activity would cause the incumbent's vote to fall. This
assumption, however, is by no means obviously correct. Like many topics in the
empirical study of voting, economic theory offers little guidance. It may well be the case
that voters are accustomed to economic growth, and that an increase in activity does not
affect their views on the performance of the economy to the same extent that an identical
decrease in activity would; it is also possible that the effect may work in the opposite
direction. We test this assumption at the national level by examining GROWTH and
GOODNEWS.
First, we use the method described in Javier (1993) to test whether or not changes
in real per capita GOP have symmetrical effects on the incumbent share of the two party
vote. Changes in real per capita GOP are divided into increases and decreases as shown:

For example, setting DIVIDED equal to 0 when the President's party controls one or neither of the
two Houses of Congress and equal to 1 under unified government does not change the results .

6
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POSGROWTH = GROWTH if GROWTH>O.
NEGGROWTH = GROWTH if GROWTH<O.

Fair's vote equation is estimated with these two variables in place of GROWTH. The
regression results, shown in Table lA, initially seem encouraging for our hypothesis.
They suggest that an increase in real per capita GDP of 1 percentage point leads to an
increase in VOTE of 0.62 percentage points, while the same decrease in real per capita
GDP will decrease VOTE by 0.71 percentage points. However, a test for the equivalence
of the two parameters is needed. The test forces the coefficients on POSGROWTH and
NEGGROWTH equal to each other, and then compares the residual sum of squares

(URSS) from the unrestricted equation with the residual sum of squares from the
restricted equation (RRSS), which uses the variable ALLGROWTH. The test clearly
suggests that the coefficients on POSGROWTH and NEGGROWTH are not significantly
different from each other. Though this may be a product of the relatively limited number
of observations (there are only 5 instances of negative growth and 18 cases of positive),
the results do seem to indicate that the effect of changes in real per capita GDP have
symmetrical effects on VOTE.
The GOODNEWS variable is another candidate for asymmetry. It may be the case
that voters respond by punishing the incumbent for quarters of "bad news " in the same
way that they reward the incumbent for quarters of growth over 3.2%, or they may react
more harshly to bad news. To examine this question, the variable BADNEWS is created
and is set equal to the number of quarters of negative growth that took place during the
first 15 quarters of a President's term in office.

24

Table 1.4 - Is Economic Voting Asymmetrical? (GROWTH)

Unrestricted Model

Restricted Model

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Intercept

47.274
(18.023)***

Intercept

47.263
(18.62)***

Party

-2.68
(-4.14)* **

Party

-2.67
(-4.27)* **

Person

3.356
(2.28)* *

Person

3.298
(2.34)**

Duration

-3.337
(-2.66)**

Duration

-3.33
(-2.75)**

War

5.858
( 1.99)*

War

5.61
(2.09)*

Inflation

-0.641
(-2.08)*

Inflation

-0.657
(-2.26)* *

GoodNews

1.093

GoodNews

1.075
(4.31)***

(4.072)***
PosGrowth

0.63

AllGrowth

(6.14)***

(2.53)**
NegGrowth

0.68

-0.716
(3.80)**

2

R Adjusted
S£
F

0.85
2.62
16.78

N
23
URSS
96.43
*** denotes sign ificance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
* denotes significance at 10% level

2

R Adjusted
S£
F

0.86
2.54
20.45

N
RRSS

23
96.84
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Another definition of the variable is also tried, but not reported, in which BADNEWS is
equal to the number of quarters in which real per capita GDP fell by 3.2% or more. Like
with Fair's GOODNEWS variable, the BADNEWS variable is set to

°

during the elections

of 1920, 1944, and 1948, years in which elections were dominated by concerns over
World War I and World War II. The results shown in Table 1.5, however, show that
voters do not seem to punish incumbents for quarters of poor performance in the same
way that they reward them. The value of the coefficient for GOODNEWS is durable, and
the variable remains significant across both specifications. Quarters of negative growth,
on the other hand, seem to have no effect on VOTE - apart, of course, from negati ve
growth in the election year, which is captured in the GROWTH variable. This is a
surprising result, and it suggests that there may be some asymmetry in voter's perceptions
of Presidential performance, at least as defined by GOODNEWS. As long as growth is
restored to normal by election year, though, it seems that economic sins can be forgiven.
Conversely, voters remember quarters of strong performance prior to the election year.
Theory offers little guidance in explaining these results, and it seems that the question of
whether or not asymmetry exists in economic voting offers a potential avenue for further
research.
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Table 1.S - Is Economic Voting Asymmetrical? - (GOODNEWS).

Coefficient

t-statistic

Intercept

47 .336
(17 .55)***

Party

-2.67
(-4.10)***

Person

3 .383
(2 .09)*

Duration

-3.291
(-2 .54)**

War

5.423
-1.69

Inflation

-0.647
(-2 .06)*

Growth

0.675
(5.50) ***

Goodnews

1.073
(4 .15)***

BadNews
(Growth <O)

-0 .034
(-0 .12)

R2 Adjusted
SE
F

0.85
2.63
16.72
N
23
*** denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
* denotes significance at 10% level

III. Summary
The replication and extension of the Fair model has in some places supported the
work of other papers in the economic voting literature, but has elsewhere suggested that
further study is needed to determine the true nature of the relationship between

27

incumbent vote share and the relevant variables. The results unequivocally suggest that
the presence of divided government does not weaken the strength of economic voting.
Moreover, the paper also indicate that both Fair and similar papers on national economic
voting are correct in using election year growth in real per capita GDP as opposed to a
specification taking into account growth from earlier in the president's term. Fair also
seems to have correctly identified the relationship between inflation over the President's
term and incumbent vote share. Inflation in recent quarters does not appear to have an
immediate effect on the voter; rather, the overall change over four years is more
important. It could be that this is due to a Phillips Curve relationship, where the short
term detrimental effects of inflation on incumbent vote share are offset by reduced
unemployment and growth. GOODNEWS, on the other hand, seems to have a relatively
constant effect across the duration of a term. Finally, GROWTH seems to have a
symmetric effect on presidential vote share, while quarters of GOODNEWS have the
same effect regardless of when they occur, ceteris paribus.

Chapter Two - State Forecasting
I. Introduction

The preceding sections have laid out the basic theory of economic voting as it
works at the national level and examined some of the specific elements of how it function
in practice. There is a very large body of scholarly work on these topics, but the
explanation and forecasting of election results at the state level, has received considerably
less attention. Among all the scholarship consulted for this paper, only five studies could
be found that built a pooled cross-sectional model to explain US presidential election
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results as this paper does (Rosenstone 1983, Holbrook 1991, Campbell 1992 and 2006,
Strumpf and Phillippe 1999, Eisenberg 2004). Yet it is a topic well-worth investigating.
While a national forecasting equation aggregates the political preferences and local
economic trends of the country into a simple national model , a state forecasting equation
must account for variation not just from election to election, but also from state to state.
The remainder of the paper will focus on the task of developing an econometric model to
forecast, as accurately as possible, the results of presidential elections in the states using
data available prior to the election.

II. Literature Review

Though most of the literature on economic forecasting is meant to predict the
national popular vote of US presidential elections, there are several studies available that
examine state results. A close reading of these studies should help inform this analysis
and provide a frame of reference for both the specification of a model and the
interpretation of its results.

Rosenstone
Most early work in economic voting theory and election forecasting centered on
the national presidential race - Rosenstone (1983) was the first effort to predict the
presidential vote in individual states. Like more contemporary state forecasting models,
Rosentone pools elections, (in his case from 1948 to 1972), and estimates a model to
explain the Democratic share of the two party vote. As Campbell (1992) and Holbrook
(1991) point out, his model is remarkably accurate, accounting for 93% of the variance in
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vote share and yielding a mean absolute error of 2.9 percentage points. Furthermore, it
lays the groundwork for more recent work, with its theory that the state vote share
depends on the national and state economy, long-term political predispositions, and
election year political variables that take into account issue stances, incumbency, and
duration. However, the model achieves its ex post accuracy at the cost of a number of
factors that hinder its ex ante forecasting value.
His model 's lack of parsimony is one of its chief flaws . With 25 political and
economic variables and 49 state dummies, the model accounts for much of the variation
in vote share through brute force . Particularly troublesome for an ex ante forecasting
model is the inclusion of a number of idiosyncratic variables, such as positions on a range
of social issues, a dummy variable for "mismanagement of wars," and a dummy variable
for Kennedy's Catholicism in 1980. Though any of these factors are likely important in a
given race, they are difficult to generalize from one election to another, and several are
subjective in nature. Most importantly, data for some of the variables Rosenstone uses,
including his measure of economic growth, are not available until after the election
occurs.

State Cross-se ctional
A number of cross-sectional studies have also emerged that explain state results
for a single election year, focusing primarily on economic variables (Abrams 1980;
Brunk and Gough 1983; Blackley and Shepard 1994; Abrams and Butkiewicz 1995).
Since national economic conditions are constant in these analyses, they tend to overstate
the importance of local economic conditions and understate the importance of national
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ones. Some of these papers (Blackley and Shepard 1994; Abrams and Butkiewicz 1995)
account for a state 's political predisposition by using the state's vote for a party in the
previous election as a control, a specification that influences this study. Broadly, these
works suggest that state economic conditions do matter for presidential elections, but
these results must be viewed with some skepticism, as a single cross-section cannot
measure fluctuations in national conditions that may in reality overshadow state
economic variables.

Holbrook
The work of Holbrook (1991) is an advance over election-year cross-sectional
studies and is relatively close to the analysis presented here. Holbrook builds a pooled,
cross-sectional model , for the elections from 1960 to 1984, to explain the statewide
percentage of the two-party vote for the incumbent presidential party 's candidate.
Elections are a function of a combination of long and short-term, political and economic,
and state-level and national variables. His model is more parsimonious than previous
attempts by other authors, particularly Rosenstone ( 1983), and it offers a useful
theoretical explanation of the basic task confronted in forecasting state election results.

In any given year, the variation (range) in electoral support across states can be
largely explained by state-level political and economic variables. While variations
in a single-cross section may be adequately explained by these factors, variation
in the general level of electoral support (mean) for the president's party across
cross-sections (over time) is not likely to be explained by factors that occur only
at the state level. Instead , this variation is explained by the national political and
economic context of the election.
This is an important theoretical statement. Holbrook argues that since many of the
contemporary state forecasting models have dealt with only a single cross-section, they
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overstate the importance of state-level variables, since national variables are constant
across the entire sample. Thus, it is impossible to measure the independent effects of the
national economy on vote shares in individual states. This is an important omission, and
the coefficient estimates of state-level variables tend to be artificially inflated as a result.
To better illustrate the distinction between cross-sectional and pooled cross
sectional models, Holbrook first tests a cross-sectional model , focusing on state variables.
He first includes "long-term variables that represent the baseline level of the dependent
variables." These long term factors are explained by variables for state partisanship and
political ideology. An index of party competition, bounded by zero and one, captures the
overall electoral strength of the parties within each state . To measure ideology, Holbrook
uses an indicator of the roll call voting behavior of the state's Congressional delegation,
as measured by Conservative Coalition support and opposition scores; states with
conservative populations should elect conservative House delegations, and, thus, be more
inclined to support Republican candidates. Holbrook also includes a regional control
variable to capture the historical strength of Southern candidates running in Southern
states.
Holbrook suggests that economic factors will cause most of the short-term
fluctuations in the dependent variable. State unemployment and the statewide percentage
change in real per capita income capture the effect of the local economy on the election.
Holbrook also controls for the advantage that presidential and vice-presidential
candidates enjoy in elections in their home state. A home region variable also controls for
the advantage a candidate may have campaigning in states that share a border with his
home state.
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Moving to a pooled cross-sectional model allows for the addition of national
context variables to the equation - primarily, economic ones. The percentage change in
real per capita personal income and the national unemployment rate measure US
economic performance under the incumbent administration. Holbrook writes that the
correlation between unemployment and income is low enough for these variables to
account for distinct economic phenomena and not to cause the problems of high
collinearity. To capture the national political climate, presidential popularity is used to
reflect support for policies that cannot be directly modeled; the higher the support for the
incumbent, the higher should be the support for his party's candidate. An incumbency
variable controls for the advantage that sitting presidents have in winning reelection.
His pooled model yields a mean absolute error of 4.4 percentage points and an R 2
of 0.66, a less accurate model than those of Campbell (1992, 2006), Strumpf and
Phillippe (1999) , and Rosenstone (1983). Still, Holbrook 's work yields valuable results
that can help inform this research. Like the other works in the field, Holbrook's model
points to the primacy of national economic factors over state ones. State real per capita
personal income growth, for example, is significant in his cross-sectional specifications,
but loses significance in the pooled version . This finding seems to suggest that state
economic conditions have little independent influence on the national election, beyond
simply being correlated with national conditions. Though this has been disputed by more
recent studies, it does further validate the finding that the national economy is more
important in a presidential election than the local economy.
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Strumpf and Phillippe
Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) and Campbell (1992, 2006) are the most
contemporary and comprehensive works available that seek to explain state election
returns. These models represent advances over older works in both their explanatory
power and theoretical underpinnings. Their formulations implicitly draw on the basic
logic of Fair - voters are retrospective, and punish incumbent party candidates for poor
economic performance and reward them for good performance, while looking back over
a time frame no longer than one administration. These works represent advances, though,
because they most effectively control for the partisan and ideological inclinations of each
state. Their treatment of this important issue heavily influences this research.
Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) begin their paper by advancing the plausible
hypothesis that the most important determinants of two-party vote share in a state are not
national or state economic fluctuations, but rather the partisan predispositions of that
state. Voters without strong partisan or ideological ties will be influenced at the margins
by economics, but each party's loyalists are unlikely to be swayed by economic
performance over the life of one administration. The authors model this tendency by
including state fixed effects in a panel of elections. They build a pooled cross-sectional
model for the period from 1972-1992, and estimate the Democratic share of the two-party
vote.
The regressors in the model include economic and political variables at both the
state and the national levels. National per capita real personal income growth, the
national unemployment rate, and the growth rates in the consumer price index measure
national economic performance; their state-level equivalents capture the effect of the
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local economy. The authors discuss several possible variations on the time frame of the
economic variables, but they eventually settle on a model that incorporates information
primarily from the two years immediately preceding the election. For political variables,
dummies measure the effect of incumbency and the advantage that candidates receive
from running in their home states. The authors estimate state dummies to capture the
partisan leanings of each state - these capture the effects of partisanship and ideology.
As Strumpf and Phillippe note, these state-fixed effects are the lynchpin of their
model. The removal of state dummies decreases the model 's explanatory power
precipitously, from an R2 of 0.866 to 0.299, and also seems to result in omitted variable
bias, as parameter estimates and t-statistics for other variables change markedly. The
inclusion of state fixed effects allow the authors to draw their other main conclusion
that local economic variables matter, but that national economic conditions are more
important. Their model is relatively effective in forecasting , as it yields a median absolute
error of 2.6 percentage points for an ex ante forecast of the 1996 presidential election.
Though the state-fixed effect dummies represent an improvement over the
political controls of earlier works in the field, they are not without problems. The authors
note that their state dummies are roughly analogous to the constant in Fair's national
model. The state dummies reflect a consistent baseline of support across a pool of
elections over time within a given state. This is meant to control for partisan and
ideological inclination. But if the value is consistent, this implies that the partisan
predisposition of the state is consistent across the entire pool of elections. For a time span
of twenty years, this is not a reasonable assumption. This is one of the important
differences between Strumpf and Phillipe and the work of Campbell (1992, 2006).
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Though similar in many respects, Campbell controls for states' partisan predispositions in
a way that is variable over time .

Campbell
Campbell lays out his initial model in a 1992 paper, covering 531 state elections
from 1948 to 1988. His 2006 paper updates and slightly revises the original model, and
expands the sample to include elections through 2004. Though Campbell's model is
similar to Strumpf and Phillippe's, Campbell uses a more comprehensive set of political
variables and regional dummies to account for variation across both time and space. Like
Strumpf and Phillippe, the Democratic share of the two-party vote is his dependent
variable. However, he only uses one national economic regressor, the second quarter
change in real GNP . Also like Strumpf and Phillippe, and most other economic voting
papers, his model includes a dummy variable to measure the positive effect of
incumbency on a candidate's vote share. Unlike Strumpf and Phillippe, however,
Campbell uses a national Gallup trial-heat poll result, taken in September following both
parties' national conventions, to capture elements that may affect the election but could
be difficult to model- foreign policy, the relative effectiveness of opposing campaigns,
the idiosyncrasies of the candidates - the poll proxies for these sorts of important but
unquantifiable factors.
At the state level, Campbell is again sparse in his modeling of the effect of
economic activity on the election, using only personal income growth between the fourth
quarter and the first quarter of the election year. But more importantly, he uses a host of
state political variables that do not appear in Strumpf and Phillippe to capture the partisan
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inclinations of states. One of these is the deviation from the national vote. If one party has
done better in a particular state in past elections than it has done nationally, then it seems
reasonable to expect that party's candidate to perform relatively well in that state in the
next election. He also uses specific indicators for state and partisan ideological leanings.
To measure a state's partisanship, the party division of the lower chamber of the state
legislature after the previous midterm election is used; states with more Republicans in
the State House should be more likely to vote Republican in presidential elections. The
same goes for ideology. The author uses a state ideology index, calculated from
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and Americans for Constitutional Action
(ACA) ratings of the roll call votes of each state 's congressional delegation. M.ore
conservative states will tend to send more conservative delegations to Washington, and
these states will tend to vote Republican in presidential elections.
Campbell also includes a series of state and regional dummies to account for local
electoral factors not explained by partisanship or ideology. Home state presidential and
vice-presidential advantage dummies take into account the increased support candidates
can expect to recei ve when contesting an election in their home states. Similarly, a
Southern regional dummy accounts for the historical advantages enjoyed by Southern
presidential candidates in contests in their home region . Finally, Campbell uses a series
of regional dummies to pick up remaining variation, particularly for electoral trends
across a region. Each regional trend is specified as a dummy variable for a single election
year; Campbell seeks to identify realigning elections and capture the shift with the
regional trend variable in the realigning year. He writes that "it is unnecessary to specify
continuing effects, since the effects of a regional shift in later elections should be
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reflected in a state's vote deviations in previous elections and its state legislative partisan
divisions."
His findings corroborate the results of other studies, which suggest that national
economic conditions are more important determinants of state election returns than are
local conditions. The 2006 update has a mean absolute error of 3.2 percentage points, and
correctly predicts 87 percent of all electoral votes. The ex post errors that his model does
make are largely attributable to the difficulty of explaining outcomes over such a long
time frame. The problems of tracking regional political trends, accounting for electoral
realignments, and dealing with outlier elections (caused by such factors as Kennedy's
Catholicism in 1960 or Strom Thurmond's insurgent candidacy in 1948), are exacerbated
over a relatively long sample. Given these constraints, his model fits the existing data
quite well.
Two elements of Campbell's model merit particular discussion. One of these is
his variable for state deviations from the national vote in past elections, which he uses to
control for partisan and ideological inclination. Clearly, state deviations from the past
national votes will be correlated with future results. Part of this correlation can be
explained by partisan/ideological factors that hold relatively constant over a span of four
years. But the results of a given state election relative to the national election are
influenced by more than just the intermediate to long term factors which Campbell uses
the deviation variable to measure, but also by such short term factors as fluctuations in
state economic activity and presidential and vice-presidential home state advantages. In
effect, Campbell is using these factors, whose effects are unique to just one election, to
explain the results of a later election. The forecasting accuracy the deviation variable
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contributes to the overall model should overweigh these particular concerns if it is to be
included in our study.
The regional trend variables are also worth discussing. For the purposes of fitting
the model to past data, particularly over such a large pool, the trends may be warranted.
However, as Campbell acknowledges, these variables are cumbersome in a forecasting
model.
Considerable research ... indicates regional partisan shifts beginning in the early
1960s, with some regions (most notably the South) moving in the Republican
direction while others became more Democratic. Although many of these
disruptions to preexisting state partisan dispositions could not themselves have
been anticipated and are thus of questionable forecasting value, their inclusion is
necessary for a reasonably complete general model over an extended series of
elections across a diverse set of states (1992) .
Unlike the state fixed effects in Strumpf and Phillippe, these regional trend variables are
specified as single, discrete events - they occur in one election. Campbell suggests that
"it is unnecessary to specify continuing effects, since the effects of a regional shift in later
elections should be reflected in a state's vote deviations in previous elections and its state
legislative partisan divisions." His work suggests that state deviations and legislative
partisan divisions cannot be used to predict the elections in question, because these are
realigning elections - the composition of the State House has not yet changed in time for
the election, nor has the state 's ideology in any measurable way . If Campbell is right, the
trend variable should account for the realignment effect, and thus improve the model's
historical fit. However, by the very nature of the se trends, they cannot be predicted, as
Campbell admits, so they are not useful for the purposes of this paper, which is designed
to forecast election results with data available ahead of time .
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II. The Fair Model Applied to the States
Prior to the development of a state-specific forecasting model, it is useful to think
carefully about what must go into such a model that would differentiate it from a national
one. Some factors remain important, although they may be more or less prominent at the
state level. The national economy, the duration of a party's time in office, and the
advantages of incumbency should still be important. The most prominent difference,
though, will be in the treatment of parties and the partisan orientation of voters. Where
Fair's national model varies only across time, a pooled state model must vary across both
space and time (Holbrook 1991). While party allegiances have certainly shifted back and
forth in the US, a broad, rough parity between them has persisted. This is not to imply
that there have been no realigning elections or swings in supports towards either the
Democrats or the GOP in Fair's sample; it means that support for both parties, at the
national level, has been stable enough that an aggregate model like Fair's can forecast the
two party vote accurately with only an intercept term and a party dummy to account for
the role of partisan loyalties in an election.' The intercept term reflects this relatively
stable base of support a candidate of either party can expect to receive, and PARTY
reflects the slight but noticeable and consistent support for Republican presidential
candidates over the sample period. But according to Fair's model, short term economic
and political factors swing elections.
Predicting the results of state elections, though, requires closer attention to
political variation in both time and space. Even a cross-sectional model demands that the
equation account for the partisan leanings of each state, and for the additional support

7 Recall that Fair initially sought to control for underlying trends in party support by including a time
trend variable in his 1978 model, but that he since dropped it as it lost its explanatory power.
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that presidential or vice presidential candidates running in their home states can expect to
receive. Though rough parity exists between the parties nationally, in a given state, this is
unlikely to be true. And it is extremely important that these political leanings be captured
accurately - while short term fluctuations may swing national elections, most of the
variation in vote share across states can be explained by underlying political
predispositions (Strumpf and Phillippe 1999). Though some voters may be swayed by
economic fluctuations in an election year, most voters are predisposed to support one
party or the other. The intercept and party dummy account for these predispositions at the
aggregate level, but they vary markedly from state to state. Moreover, the level of support
for each party in a given state changes over elections. While rough parity may be
maintained nationally, political leanings wax and wane in each state. A pooled cross
sectional model must also take this into account, by controlling for partisan and
ideological predisposition in such a way that it is allowed to vary both from election to
election and from state to state.
To demonstrate the importance of this distinction between a national model and a
state forecasting model, Fair's equation was used to predict the incumbent's share of the
two party vote in each state election from 1916 to 2004, with separate regressions for
each state. The results illustrate both the importance of a few national factors in state
elections, and also the importance of the absent space/time partisanship variables. This
application is certainly not the use intended use of Fair's model, and it clearly has
specification biases, particularly in the form of omitted variables. This bias, combined
with the model's low statistical power (since it still has a sample of only 16 elections),
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results in wrong signs and high standard errors. Still, the application has interpretive
value, and the results can inform an explicitly state-oriented approach.
The results require some unpacking before the relevance of these 50 regressions
can be interpreted. To compare the results to the Fair model, three criteria were
considered. First, for a given variable, in how many of the states was that variable
significant and of the same sign as in the Fair model? Secondly, what is the size of the
coefficient in the national model as opposed to the state model ? To get some sense of the
relative importance of variables at the national and state levels, we take an average of
each coefficient from all 50 equations, and then compare that average to Fair 's estimate.
While bearing in mind the important caveats of sample size and omitted variable bias,
this comparison may give some indication of the relative importance of different
variables to state vote share. Finally, we consider the adjusted R2 • We take an average of
the 50 state regressions, and then also look to some specific outlier states to see if any
further conclusions can be drawn.
A review of the parameter estimates for the economic variables indicates that the
mean of the state parameter estimates are, in most cases, surprisingly close to the
corresponding figures in the national model. GROWTH and INFLATION , on average,
have the same signs and are comparable in parameter estimates across both models. The
coefficient on GOODNEWS is smaller in the state model , but is still positive. GROWTH
is significant and of the expected sign in 19 of the 50 states, INFLATION in 16, and

GOODNEWS in 25. These figures may seem relatively low, but it is important to
remember that omitted variable bias is driving part of these results. Table 2.1 shows the
average coefficients and average summary statistics from the state regressions, while
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Figure 2.3 shows this information graphically and gives a sense of how the average
values of each variable compares to the coefficient values of the Fair national model.
The political variables are perhaps more noteworthy. PERSON and WAR act in
unexpected ways when applied to the state model. WAR remains positive, but its
coefficient jumps from 5.61 in Fair's specification to a 14.3 average across the states. It is
significant and of the expected sign in 27 states. The coefficient for PERSON, on the
other hand, averages -0.277 for the state models, as compared to 3.3 in the national
equation; it is positive and significant in only three states. Both of these results are
difficult to explain. WAR is on relatively shaky theoretical footing even in Fair's
specification, and is equal to 1 only three times in each sample, so it is understandable
that its estimate could vary sharply. The coefficient value and lack of significance of

PERSON, however, is surprising and is difficult to attribute to anything other than
specification bias that results from applying Fair's model to the states. DURATION
remains negative on average, but the absolute value of its coefficient estimate increases
from -3.3 to an average of -9.08 in the state specification. It is negative and significant in
33 states, the most of any variable. Though the large coefficient on DURATION comes as
a surprise, there is some support for the strong importance of this variable in political
science literature (Abramowitz 2004, Campbell 2004 [Forwn]). Their research suggests
that presidents seeking a second term for their party tend to do quite well, whereas those
seeking a third term for their party rarely win election (George H.W. Bush being the
modern exception). DURATION accounts for this party fatigue.
The last variable to be considered is PARTY. A brief glance at its average
coefficient in the state regressions, -2.56, seems to suggest that it is quite close to the
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-2.68 estimate of the Fair model. Moreover, it is second only to WAR in terms of the
number of states in which it is significant and of the expected sign, at 27 states. But
consider what this means. Because of how the variable is coded, its coefficient indicates
that in these 27 states, all else fixed, Republican candidates tend to better than
Democratic candidates. Some of the states that are negative and significant include
Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, and Oregon, states that have hardly been bastions of
Republican support in recent elections. This serves to illustrate the importance of a state
forecasting model's ability to account for political differences across both time and space;
while the party dummies and intercepts serve to differentiate between states, these
estimates are a best-fit line of results ranging from 1916 to 2004, over which time
political predispositions may have changed drastically within a given state. Figures 2.1 a
to 2.1 c chart the value of PARTY for each state, while Figure 2.2 shows, for each
variable, in how many state regressions that variable is significant and of the expected
sign.
Given its specification bias and inability to account for changing political
conditions, though, the adopted state model exhibits a surprisingly high average adjusted
R 2 of 0.615, compared to Fair's 0.905. Of course, there is tremendous variation from state
to state. The model explains only 37% of the variation in the vote share in Alabama,
largely because of Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat campaigns. Kansas, on the other hand,
has an adjusted R 2 of 0.79. Clearly, however, the central lesson from this experiment is
that a more detailed analysis is required to explain state vote share. Local economic
conditions, partisan predisposition, and special factors unique to certain elections, such as
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the presence of a candidate from the state , must be accounted for in order to explain and
predict election returns. That is the task to which this research turns next.

Table 2.1 - Fair State Model: Average Coefficients

Mean
Median
Max
Min
Sid

Intercept
54.9
55
69
40

Party
-2.56
-3.2
10.2
-12 .2

Person
-0.27
-1.75
22
-8 .7

Duration
-9.08
-8 .15
11.7
-101

War
14.30
16.95
33.6
-11.3

Growth
0.594
0.25
4
-1.3

Inflation
-0.94
-1.1
2.7
-9

Goodnews
0.58
1.15
3.1
-9

Adj. R 2
0.61
0.62
0.79
0.37

0.54

0.56

0.64

1.48

11.91

1.22

1.46

2.20

OJJ91

Figure 2.1a - Coefficients of PARTY from the Fair State Model: Alabama to Kansas
Party (AL-KA)
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Figure 2.th - Coefficients of PARTY from the Fair State Model: Kentucky to
North Carolina
Party (KY-NCj
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Figure 2.tc - Coefficients of PARTY from the Fair State Model: North Dakota to
Wyoming
Party (ND-WY)
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Figure 2.2 - The Fair State Model: Number of States Where the Variable is
Significant and of the Hypothesized Sign
States Where the Variable is Significant and has the Expected
Sign
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Figure 2.3 - The Fair State Model- Average Values of Coefficients
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III. Theory
The basic theory of economic voting suggests that individuals choose the
candidate that provides them the highest expected utility. This estimate of expected utility
for the candidate is formed on the basis of the past economic performance of the
incumbent party , the voter's partisan inclinations, and any special factors that may
influence the choice (whether or not the incumbent party candidate is a sitting president,
for example, or whether or not a candidate is from the voter's home state). As Strumpf
and Phillipe (1999) suggest, the difference in welfare between the incumbent and the
challenger can be represented by the following equation:

EU incumbent

-

EU cha llenge r

=

j (Q) - P

wherej(Q) is the voter's evaluation of the incumbent party's performance on the
economy relative to his or her standards, and P is the challenger's relative partisan
advantage. The voter will support the incumbent party unless the partisan advantage of
the incumbent is too large.
For a state forecasting equation, the voters ' individual preferences are not known,
but there is information available on those of the whole state . These individual
preferences and evaluations of performance are aggregated across the entire state . A
linear functional form is used. For the purposes of the model, we will assume that
partisan preferences are reflected in two types of variables. One component is fixed
across time, and reflects the partisan base of a given state . Call this fixed effect D. But
state political preferences do change over time, so this variable element will be called V.
These perceptions will also be affected by the voter's perception of national political
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factors unique to that election, or N. Both national and local economic conditions play
into the voter's decision, as represented by

Qnalional

and Qlocal . The incumbent's share of

the state two party vote, then, is determined by the following equation:

Since the model is a pooled cross-sectional one, the equation accounts for variation in
time

(Q nallOnal , Qlocal ,

N, V) and from state to state (D, V,

QloCal) .

The importance of

doing this was demonstrated by the preceding section, which applied the Fair model to
the states. The Fair state model captured differences from election to election in the
national economy and national political scene , but not the preferences of each state.
Conversely, while a simple cross-section would not have to factor in the evolution in
partisan preferences within a state over time and the national context of an election, a
pooled-cross section must account for these things.

IV. Model Specification

The model seeks to explain the Democratic share of the two party vote in state
elections from 1972 to 2004. 8 1972 is used as the first year of the sample because it is the
first election after the realigning years of the 1960s, over which time the Democrats '

The use of the Democratic vote share instead of the incumbent vote share as the dependent
variable is a convention in the state literature and does not significantly alter the analysis, though
it does change the interpretation of the constant and the state dummy variables . With incumbent
vote share as the dependent variable, state dummy variables and the constant would describe a
baseline of support for the incumbent party, whereas under the current definition, these variables
account for the state's consistent level of support for Democratic candidates. The state dummies
(also referred to as fixed effects) are meant to capture partisan leanings in each state, so using
Democratic vote share as the dependent variable gives these dummies clearer interpretive
meaning in the context of a state model and allows them to better control for a state's
partisanship.

8
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support for civil rights legislation caused them to lose control of the Southern states and
the electoral map to be permanently be redrawn. 9 Partisan preferences are thus more
stable over this time period than they would be with a sample that included earlier
elections. The 1972 election was also the first after the 26 th Amendment was passed in
1969, which lowered the legal voting age to 18. There are, therefore, no significant
expansions of the voting population during this time that could bias the results. Finally, to
start with an earlier election would also implicitly assume that there is a stable
relationship between economic variables and election results over a longer period, which
may not be a valid assumption going back to earlier decades.
Theory suggests that the model must account for political and economic factors at
both the national and state level. To capture the effect of the national and state economies
on the election, we need to first account for the definition of the dependent variable and
what it means for our measures of economic activity. Since Fair's model described the
effect of the economy on the incumbent vote, he could leave economic variables
untransformed. In this state specification, though, the dependent variable is the
Democratic share of the two party vote, so the economic variables need to be redefined.
Consider growth. An increase in growth should help the incumbent, but, for this study,
what matters is the effect that it has on the Democratic candidate. If the Democratic Party
is the incumbent party, both the incumbent and the Democratic vote share will increase,
so no changes need to be made. If the Republicans control the White House, though, the
There have been 450 state elections from 1972 to 2004, but only 447 were included for this
study. The results from Alabama in 1972 and Mississippi in 1972 and 1976 are major outliers
and were omitted. In 1968, Alabama and Mississippi were won by a third party candidate, George
Wallace, making the DEVIATION variable meaningless for the 1972 elections in these states. The
model was also incapable of explaining the 1976 election in Mississippi, a Carter victory, which
had been preceded by an overwhelming Nixon victory of 78.2 percent to 19.63; this extraordinary
result drastically affected the estimation of the Mississippi state dummy and biased future
predictions for the state.
9
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increase in growth will help the incumbent party and reduce the Democratic vote share.
To account for this, we multiply the economic variable in question by PARTY, a dummy
variable that equals 1 when the Democrats are the incumbent party and -1 for the
Republicans. (Appendix C lists all the variables included in the state model and provides
their exact definition).
Measures for growth in real per capita personal income and unemployment
capture the importance of the national economy . This is a common specification for
measuring national economic activity in the state voting literature (Holbrook 1991,
Eisenberg 2004). Personal income growth (INCOME) is used to capture the positive
effect of growth on the incumbent party vote instead of GDP because it is more closely
related to the state measure for growth, and because it includes government transfer
payments, which GDP does not. (Still, the two are closely related, with a correlation
coefficient of 0.84, and replacing one for the other changes the results very little).
Unemployment (U) is also used to account for national economic performance. Though
related to changes in income, it captures the effect of a different economic phenomenon 
voter anxieties over job security. As unemployment increases, voters should be less
inclined to support the incumbent party's candidate.
Of the four papers since Rosenstone (1983) that have built pooled, cross-sectional
models to explain presidential election results, only Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) have
included a measure of inflation. The other three (Holbrook 1991 , Campbell 1992, 2006,
Eisenberg 2004) have left it out. This study also omits changes in the price level. The
inflation varia ble is procyclical and tends to be highl y correlated with measures of real
per capita growth, and, in several preliminary specifications, was found to have a positive
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sign (though it did not often exhibit significance). Clearly, this does not capture the
expected relationship between higher inflation and voting results, so inflation is left out
of the equation.
State personal income growth (STINCOME) and state unemployment (STU) are
similarly used to capture the effect of the local economy on state vote share. There is
disagreement in the literature on the extent to which the state economy matters in
presidential elections, and whether it is significant at all. Eisenberg (2004) and Strumpf
and Phillippe (1999) find it significant in a few specifications. Campbell (1992, 2006)
finds state conditions significant, while Holbrook (1991) is unable to reject the null
hypothesis that they have no effect on vote share. The question is ultimately an empirical
one, although both state and national conditions may be important. Economic voting may
affect elections both through the conditions voters perceive around them and those that
they are aware of nationally. Including state economic indicators allows for a comparison
of the relative importance of national and local economic conditions.
The model uses two national political variables. INCUMBENCY controls for the
advantage that sitting presidents have in running for reelection (in US history, 21 of 28
incumbents running for reelection have won their races). This is a standard variable in
both national and state literature. Somewhat less common, though, is the next variable,

TRIALHEAT, defined as the proportion of all committed voters polled who back the
Democratic candidate in the first September Gallup poll following the national party
conventions (Campbell 1992, 2006). (If the Republican and Democrat candidates are tied
in the polls at 45 percent each, with 10 percent undecided, the value of TRIALHEA Twill
be 50). TRIALHEAT proxies for otherwise-unquantifiable factors that affect election
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results. Views on foreign and social policy, characteristics of the candidates, campaigns,
scandals - all these things influence election results, but are not caught in economic
variables or state political predisposition indicators. TRIALHEAT, then , accounts for
these factors by how they influence national polling, which should be reflected in results
across the country. It should also pick up the effect of Fair's DURATION variable, which
accounts for the tendency of voters to vote against a party that has been in office for
several terms.
It bears repeating that TRIA LHEAT is a national variable being used to explain a

state result, so the model is not seeking to describe a tautological relationship, nor will it
be influenced or highly correlated with state economic or political variables. In adding
this variable, though, there is some legitimate concern that it may be highly correlated
with national variables - INCUMBENCY, GROWTH, and UNEMPLOYMENT. The
simple correlation coefficients show, however, that this is not the case . The correlation
coefficients between the TRIAL HEAT and INCUMBENCY, GROWTH, and

UNEMPLOYMENT are just 0.47,0.33, and 0.15, respectively . These are not high enough
to justify major concern. The most important test is an empirical one, and depends on
whether or not the model improves the forecasting accuracy of the model.
The most important variables in the model, and the most difficult ones to control
for, are partisan predispositions. To capture the importance of party affiliation and
partisan predisposition in state election results, we need variables that capture both the
long term baseline level of support for Democratic candidates that voters exhibit over
time . These variables will be constant for each state time series. It is also necessary to
account for changes in the electorate over time. Since 1972, political preferences have
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evolved, and the model needs dynamic variables to capture this evolution. Ideally, all the
partisan control variables would be dynamic. But the dynamic state partisan controls are
limited in how effectively they can proxy for the state's political inclinations, and the
variables are prone to fluctuate much more than underlying trends would dictate. The
addition of the state constants, then, serves to make these forecasts more accurate and
consistent.
The baseline level of support for Democratic presidential candidates in a state is
modeled as a fixed effect, or state dummy, similar to Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) .
Wyoming is used as the base state, so the estimated coefficient for the dummy of any
other state will indicate how much more or less that state votes for the Democratic
candidate relative to Wyoming, ceteris paribus.

IDEOLOGY and DEVIATION capture the state 's partisan leanings in presidential
elections in a way that varies measurably over time. IDEOLOGY measures the liberal or
conservative leanings of a state (Holbrook and Poe 1987). The variable uses the ratings
by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), which rates Members of Congress on a
scale from 1 to 100 based on their voting records, with 100 being the most liberal.

IDEOLOGY is the average of these voting records for each of the three years before the
election year (ADA ratings will not be available for the election year in time for
forecasting purposes). States that send more liberal delegations to Congress should be
more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. DEVIATION measures the state's
deviation from the national popular vote in the most recent election. This is measured as
the Democratic candidate's share of the two party vote at the state level in the most recent
election, minus the share of the national two party vote that same year (Campbell 1991,
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2006). If the Democratic candidate does better relative to the national vote in the previous
election, we can expect that there are underlying partisan factors at work explaining these
results, so DEVIATION should be positively correlated with the dependent variable. It's
worth noting that this construction is not ideal, because other factors influence the state
results beyond the partisan movements the variable is designed to proxy for. While
national trends are accounted for, since DEVIATION is defined in terms of its relation to
the national vote , state factors, including economic conditions, may affect the variable in
a way other than it was intended. Empirically, though, state economic conditions have
only a minor effect on the state vote, and inclusion of DEVIA TION improves the
historical and out of sample forecasting accuracy of the model, so these theoretical
concerns prove unimportant in practice.
Other works in the literature on forecasting state presidential vote shares employ
an additional measure of partisan predisposition - the share of the state legislature
controlled by the Democratic Party before the presidential election. The expectation is
that the more Democrats in a state House, the more likely the state's voters will be to vote
for the Democratic president for Congress. This variable was considered for the use of
this model as well, but the correlation between state vote and the Democratic Party 's
share of the White House is weaker than might be expected. Several Southern states defy
the logic of the state legislature party division variable. Many have overwhelmingly
Democratic legislatures yet vote consistently for Republican presidential candidates.

10

This speaks to the different sort of politics practiced at the federal and state levels.
Democrats in a state legislature may be significantly more conservative than their
Consider Alabama, which as of 2008 had sixty-two Democrats and forty-three Republicans in the
State House, or Kentucky which had 63 Democrats and thirty-six Republicans. These states went
62 to 37 percent and 60 to 40 percent respectively for Bush in 2004.

10
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counterparts in Congress, so voters may tend to vote for Democrats in state elections but
lean Republican during national elections. IDEOLOGY, on the other hand , since it uses
ratings of Members of Congress, measures how Democratic the states leans in relation to
national politics.
The last components of the model are dummy variables to account for the
advantage candidates have running in their home states or regions. PREZHOME is set
equal to 1 for a state where the Democratic candidate for president is from that state, and
-1 for a Republican. VPHOME does the same for vice presidential candidates, while
SOUTH captures the unique regional advantage that Southern candidates have running in

Southern states. South is equal to 1 for a Southern state when a Democratic candidate
from the South is running for election, -1 when the Republican candidate is from the
South, and zero when either both or neither candidates are from the region . Previous
research indicates that most regional advantages are either relativel y small or nonexistent,
but the South seems uniquely inclined to support candidates regional candidates
(Campbell 2006).
The final equation is shown below:

DemVote = ~o + ~IParty*Income + ~ 2Party*U + ~3TrialHeat + ~4Incumbency +
~ 5Party*StIncome

~IOPrezHome

+ ~ 6Party*StU + ~7Ideology + ~8Deviation + ~9StDummies +

+ ~II VPHome + ~I2South + E

V. Results

The model is estimated from 1972 to 2004 for all 50 states using ordinary least
squares; the regression results are reported in Table 2.2. A first look at the results
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suggests that the model is well specified. All of the variables are significant and of the
hypothesized sign, with the exceptions of PARTY*STlNCOME, PARTY*STU, and

VPHOME, which have the correct sign but are not significant. The statistical
insignificance of these variables does not come as a surprise - as stated previously, the
literature disagrees on whether or not state economic conditions have a significant effect
on elections. The same is true for vice presidential home state advantage. Based on these
results, though, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these variables have no effect on
vote share.

Table 2.2 Core Forecasting Model Results
Dependent Variable
Democratic share of the state two party vote
Explanatory Variable
Constant
Party*lncome
Party*U
Incumbency
Trial Heat
Party*Stlncome
Party *StU
Deviation
Ideology
PrezHome
VPHome
South
Average State Dummy
N
Adjusted R2
SE of Regression
F-sta listie
Mean Absolute Error
Median Absolute Error
State Forecasting %

Coefficient

23.034
0.887
-0.392
0.882
0.305
0.059
-0.121
0.244
0.037
4.974
1.66
3.723
6.547

t-Statistic

10.62
8.75
-2.59
1.72
10.54
1.16
-0.94
5.21
1.9
4.6
1.41
5.43
3.02

P-value

0.00
0.00
0.01
0.09
0.00
0.25
0.35
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.16
0.00
0.00

447
0.79
4.06
29.01
2.96
2.59
88%
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The results unequivocally suggest that national economic conditions matter, and
in the anticipated way, A one percentage point increase in INCOME leads to an increase
in the incumbent party vote share of 0.88 percentage points, while a reduction in the
unemployment rate of one percentage point will increase the incumbent party's vote by
0.39 percentage points. A sitting president running for reelection will have a relatively
small 0.88 percentage point boost. Also, for every additional point that the Democratic
candidate wins in the September poll, that candidate can be expected to do 0.31
percentage points better in each state in November.

DEVIATION and IDEOLOGY are both significant in the expected directions . For
every additional point difference between the state's vote for the Democrat in the
previous election and the national vote for the Democrat, the Democratic candidate for
the election year being predicted will win another 0.24 percentage points in that state.
Also , a one point increase in the rating of the state 's Congressional delegation will lead to
a 0.04 percentage point increase in the dependent variable. The state dummies take on a
range of values, depending on the relative partisan inclinations of each state, but the mean
value is 6.55, which suggests that the average state will vote 6.55 percentage points more
for the Democratic candidate than Wyoming, all else fixed." The coefficient on

PREZHOME suggests that candidates running in their home states will have an advantage
of roughly 5 percentage points over their opponents, while candidates from Southern
states running in the South against an opponent from another part of the country will have
a 3.7 percentage point advantage.
Table 2.3 shows the results of tests for the durability of these results to changes in
specification. The removal of state partisan controls illustrates just how important these
11

Appendix D shows the values of the state dummies.
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are to the model. The R2 Adjusted falls to 0.37 from 0.79 in the original model, the mean
absolute error increases to 6.1 from 2.96, and coefficient estimates become biased .
Dropping state economic variables, on the other hand, results in remarkably little change
to the parameter estimates, although these variables are kept in for forecasting purposes,
as their inclusion does lead to a slightly lower mean absolute error, both in and out of
sample. The elimination of TRJALHEAT, howe ver, does cause some changes in the
results. The state variables, as anticipated, are not greatly affected, but the parameter
estimates of the national variables change noticeably, although they do retain their sign
and significance. This does suggest that TRJALHEA T is capturing, at least to some extent,
the effect of the national variables on itself, particularly that of personal income growth.
Still, the coefficient estimates are not drastically altered, and they are well within the
range of what we would expect based on the other state papers that use polling data
(Holbrook 1991, Campbell 1992 and 2006).
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Table 2.3 Sensitivity Tests
Core
Model

No Trial
Heat

No State
Econ

No State Econ,
NoTH

No State Pa rtisan
Controls

Constant

23 .034
(10 .62)'" "'*

39.482
(23.14)"'*'"

22 .365
(10 .74)"'*'"

38 .957
(22.44)"''''*

29 .183
(10.98)"'*'"

Party*lncome

0.887
(8 .75)"'*'"

1.518
(16.35)"'*'"

0.863
(8 .63)"'*'"

1.533
(16 .31)"'*'"

0.872
(5 .07) .........

Party*U

-0 .392
(-2 .59)"'* ...

-1.028
(-6.53)"'",*

-0.459
(-5 .60)'" "'*

-0.946
(-11.67)"'* ...

-0.091
(-0. 36)

0.882
(1.72)'"

2.549
(4.61)"''''*

1.004
( 1.99)"'*

3.22
(5.96)*"'*

0.939
-1.06

Coefficient

Incumbency

Trial Heat

0.305
(10 .54)"'''''''

Party*Stlncome

0.33
(6.62)"'*'"

0.314
(11.50) .........

0.059
-1.16

0.232
(4.27)"'*'"

0.018
-0.22

Party*StU

-0.121
(-0.94)

-0 .037
(-0.25)

-0.4 12
(- 1.93)'"

Deviation

0.244
(5.21 )... ",*

0.277
(5.25)"'**

0.239
(5 .12)"'*'"

0.263
(4.89)*"""

Ideology

0.037
(1.90)'"

0.043
( 1.94)'"

0.04
(2 .08)"""

0.054
(2.45)"'*

4.974
(4 .60)"'*'"

4.782
(3 .90)"'",*

4 .846
(4 .50)"'*'"

4.418
(3 .55)"'* ...

6.512
(4 .05)"'*'"

1.66
-1.41

1.659
-1.24

1.702
-1.44

1.667
-1.22

4.489
(2.36)......

3.723
(5.43)"'*'"

5.575
(7.42)"'* ...

3.44
(5 .26)"'*'"

4.837
(6.50)'" "'*

3.308
(2.97)*"""

6.547
(3.02)"'*'"

3.029
(2.4 3) "'*

6.387
(2 .99)"'",*

5.618
(2.28)"'*

PrezHome

VPHome

South

Average Sta te
Dummy
2

Adjusted R
0.79
F
29.01
N
447
...... * denotes s ignificance at) % level
"'* denotes significance at 5% level
... denotes sign ificance at 10% level

0.73
21.5
447

0.79
29 .96
447

0.72
21.06
447

0.36
28.9
447
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The model should be judged primarily on the basis of how well it predicts election
results. The R 2 Adjusted and the mean absolute error are the first indicators of
performance. These statistics are relatively strong, with values of 0.79 and 2.96,
respecti vely. The model explains 79% of the variation in vote share and is off, on
average, by 2.96 percentage points in either direction . 12 The model predicts 88% of the
state election winners correctly. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 and Figure 2.4 provide a more
detailed account of the model 's forecasting accuracy. Table 2.4 shows how well the
model did from year to year, in terms of mean and median absolute error and in the
percentage of states for which it predicted the right candidate.

Table 2.4 Model Accuracy by Year
Election
Year
1972
1976

1980
1984
1988
1992
1996

2000
2004

Mean Absolute
Error

Median Absolute
Error

States Predicted
Accurately (%)

3.97

3.46
3.65
2.56
1.26
2.92
1.43
2.43
2.68
3.25

100

3.88
2.9\
1.78
2.66
1.93

3.04
3.08
3.5
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94
98
84
90
80

92
78

Measured in terms of mean absolute error, there doesn 't seem to be a specific profile for
the kinds of elections that the model fairs well or poorly in. 1972, 1976, and 2004 are the
worst years by this criteria, but there is no common thread between them. 1972 was a

For comparison's sake, Holbrook (1991) has an R2 Adj. of 0 .66 and a mean absolute error of
4.4. Campbell obtains an R2 Adj. of 0.84 and a mean absolute error of 3.02 in his 1992
specification, while in 2006 his results are 0.83 and 3.1. Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) is the best
in terms of forecast accuracy, with an R2 Adj. of 0.87 and a med ian absolute error of 2.2
(compared to our median absolute error of 2.59).
12
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landslide for Nixon, while 1976 and 2004 close races. 1984, the model's best year in
terms of means absolute error, was a landslide for Reagan, while 1992, the next best year ,
was a fairly close race between Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush. There is a more
obvious relationship, however, between the number of states predicted correctly and the
kind of election. Not surprisingly, the closest elections tend to be the more difficult ones
to predict (1976 , 2004), while landslides such as 1972 and 1984 were comparatively
easier to forecast. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of absolute errors. Errors from 0 to
0.99 percentage points are included under the bar for 0, I to 1.99 are included under the
bar for 1, and so forth. 58.6% of the errors are less than 3 percentage points, and slightly
less than 10% of predictions are off by 6 points or more.
A final way to analyze the residuals is by looking at some of the largest errors for
each state. Though not a hard and fast rule , the worst errors seem to be in Southern,
Republican leaning states early in the sample, though these errors do not systematically

Figure 2.4 Distribution of Errors
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favor one party or the other. Some of the smaller states appear to be problematic as well.
Table 2.5 shows the largest state forecast errors. Elections in the 1970s in Georgia,
Arkansas, and South Carolina were problematic, with errors as high as 10% for the 1976
election. Though these states went strongly Republican that year, the model still
underestimated these states' Democratic vote. This seems to have been caused by

DEVIATION, which picked up the effects of the even lower Democratic vote shares in
1972. IDEOLOGY is also a contributor - Georgia and South Carolina had scores below
10 for these elections, which probably overstates their conservatism. Some of the larger
errors are also explained by drag from the DEVIATION variable, which does not correct
for advantages that a candidate may have had from conditions in a given state unique to

Table 2.5 Largest State Forecast Errors
Dem Vote
Rank
I

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

State
Nebraska
Georgia
Arkansas
Georgia
South
Carolina
South
Carolina
Hawaii
Nevada
Nebraska
Vermont
Nebraska
Oklahoma
Vermont
Maryland
Florida
New
Hampshire
New York
Wyoming
Virginia
Nebraska

Year

(%)

Fitted

Residual

1992
1976
1976
1972

29
66 .94
65.02
24.72

42.59
53.35
51.65
35 .99

-13 .59
13.59
13.37
-11.27

1972

28.35

38.8

-10.46

1976
1972
1980
1996
2004
1984
1976
1976
2004
2004

56.57
37.52
30.07
28.43
60.3
38.69
49 .38
44 .26
56.57
47 .48

46 .7
47 .15
39.35
37 .63
51.13
29 .56
40.47
52.82
48 .21
39.22

9.86
-9 .63
-9 .28
-9.2
9.17
9.14
8.91
-8.57
8.35
8.26

2004
1996
2000
2004
1980

50.69
66 .02
29 .02
45 .87
39.45

42 .45
57.81
37. 14
37.8 5
31.44

8.24
8.2
-8 .12
8.02
8.01
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the previous election year. The model may also in some cases be underestimating the
advantages that candidates accrue from running in their home states (Carter in Georgia in
1976), or the spillover of this advantage into nearby states (Arkansas in 1976). Table 2.6
summarizes and ranks the model's average performance in each state.
Another indication of the model's utility is how well it performs out of sample.
To test this, we run ex post forecasts for the elections in 1996,2000, and 2004. The
equation is re-estimated using all the data preceding the election being forecasted, and,
using the data available at the time, we compare the re-estimated equation's predicted
results with the actual election returns. Table 2.7 shows these results. 1996 and 2000 are
strong years for the model, with 90 and 94 percent of states correct, while 2004 is not as
successful, with only 72 percent of states accurately predicted. While it is expected that
the model 's mean absolute error will rise compared to the historical one in most cases,
given that the forecast's parameter estimates do not take into account that years' results,
this is still a relati vely strong performance on balance. I)

13 In the interest s of comparison to other state models : Campbell (1992, 2006) and Holbrook
(1991) do not report ex-post results. For 1996, Strumpf and Phillippe (1999) report an ex-post
mean absolute error of 3.9 percentage points.
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Table 2.6 Model Accuracy by State (Mean Absolute Error)

Rank

Forecast Error by
State

M.A.E.

Rank

Forecast Error by
State

I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
J5
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

New Mexico
Indiana
Pennsy Ivan ia
Ohio
Minnesota
Kansas
Louisiana
Oregon
Idaho
Illinois
Michigan
Kentucky
Virginia
West Virginia
Missouri
Washington
Alaska
Wyoming
Texas
California
Wisconsin
Colorado
Arizona
Utah
Oklahoma

1.2 J
1.4
1.45
1.64
1.7
1.83
1.92
2.07
2.1
2.11
2.13
2.15
2.19
2.19
2.21
2.23
2.25
2.33
2.38
2.38
2.38
2.51
2.57
2.58
2.78

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Delaware
South Dakota
Alabama (8)
Montana
Maryland
Mississippi (7)
Massachusetts
Iowa
Hawaii
Florida
North Carolina
Nevada
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Tennessee
New York
Maine
New Jersey
North Dakota
Vermont
South Carolina
Arkansas
Georgia
New Hampshire
Nebraska

M.A.£.
2.8
2.85
2.88
2.96
3.02
3.06
3.11
3.11
3.17
3.19
3.26
3.29
3.3
3.34
3.46
3.51
3.67
3.73
3.75
3.9
3.93
3.97
4.17
4.57
7.07

Table 2.7 Ex-post Forecast Accuracy

Election
1996
2000
2004

Mean Absolute
Error
2.3
3.8
5.4

Median Absolute
Error
1.8
3.2
4.7

States Predicted Accurately
(%)
90
94
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VI. Conclusion
This study shows that state presidential election returns can be predicted with
strong accuracy using a model that combines indicators of national and local economic
performance and political factors, all as measured by data available ahead of the election.
National economic conditions are more important in explaining electoral outcomes than
state conditions, though the inclusion of state economic variables does slightly improve
the model's forecasting accuracy. State partisan predispositions are the most important
factor in explaining vote share, and these are captured using both state dummies and
dynamic variables that track partisan and ideological changes in a state over time. The
inclusion of the national trial heat poll helps account for election year political factors
that are otherwise difficult if not impossible to quantify. The results support evidence that
the South uniquely favors regional candidates, and it finds the effect of vice presidential
nominees on the vote share of their home states to be statistically insignificant. The
model achieves an historical mean absolute error of 2.96 percentage points, comparable
to or better than the errors of similar pooled cross-sectional forecasting studies, and
predicts 88% of state election results correctly. Results from ex-post forecasts of the
1996, 2000, and 2004 elections further suggest that the equation is capable of making
predictions out of sample, though this paper was completed too early to forecast the 2008
election.
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Appendix A

Definitions of National Model Explanatory Variables (Fair 2006)

INFLATJON= absolute value of the growth rate of the GOP deflator in the first
15 quarters of the administration (annual rate) except for 1920, 1944, and 1948,
where the values are zero.
GROWTH = growth rate of real per capita GOP in the first three quarters of the
election year (annual rate) .
PERSON = I if the incumbent is running for election and if otherwise
WAR = I for the elections of 1920, 1944, and 1948 and if otherwise.
DURATJON = if the incumbent party has been in power for one term , 1 if the
incumbent party has been in power for two consecutive terms, 1.25 if the
incumbent party has been in power for three consecutive terms, 1.50 for four
consecutive terms, and so on.
GOODNEWS = number of quarters in the first 15 quarters of the administration in
which the growth rate of real per capita GOP is greater than 3.2 percent at an
annual rate except for 1920, 1944, and 1948, where the values are zero.
PARTY = I if there is a Democratic incumbent at the time of the election and -1 if
there is a Republican incumbent.

°

°
°
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Appendix B
Comparison of State-Vote Equation Specifications

Dependent Variable
Oem. Share of Two-Party Vote
National Economic Indicators
Unemployment
Inflation
Income/GOP Growth
State Economic Indicators
Unemployment
Inflation
Income/GOP Growth
National Political Indicators
National poll results·
Divided Goverrunent
Presidential Incumbency
State Political Indicators
Regional Trend
Home Region Advantage (South)
Pres. Home State Advantage
VP Home State Advantage
Prior State Oev. From Nat'l Vote
State Partisanship
State Ideological Inclination
State Fixed Effects

Campbell

Strumpf Eisenberg
and
and
Phillippe Ketcham

Holbrook

yes

yes

yes

no

no
no
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
no
yes

yes
no
yes

no
no
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
no
yes

yes
no
yes

yes
no
yes

no
no
yes

no
yes
yes

yes
no
yes

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no

no
no
yes
yes
no
no
no
yes

no
no
yes
yes
no
no
no
yes

no
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no

Appendix C

Definitions of Variables
DEMVOTE = the Democratic presidential candidate 's share of the two-party vote
in a given state .
PARTY = -I when the Republican Party is the incumbent going into the election, I
for a Democratic incumbent Party
PARTY*INCOME = The annualized growth rate of real per capita personal
income in the first three quarters of the election year , multiplied by the party
dummy.
PARTY* U = The average national unemployment rate , seasonally adjusted for the
first three quarters of the election year.
INCUMBENCY = I when a Democratic president is running for reelection, = -I
when a Republican incumbent is running for reelection, and = 0 when no
incumbent is in the race (or for 1976, for Ford, who had not been elected as either
pres ident or vice president).
TRIAL HEAT = In the first Gallup poll taken in September after the party
conventions, out of all who have committed to one of the major party candidates,
the proportion of those polled who are backing the Democratic candidate.
PARTY*STATE INCOME = The annualized growth rate of state real per capita
personal income in the first three quarters of the election year, multiplied by the
party dummy.
PARTY*STATE UNEMPLOYMENT = The average state unemployment rate,
seasonally adjusted for the first three quarters of the election year.
DEVIATION = From the prior election, the Democratic candidate's share of the
two party vote minus the Democratic share of the national two party vote.
IDEOLOGY = From the ADA ratings of Members of Congress, the average rating
of the liberalism of each state's Congressional delegation from a scale of I to 100,
100 being the most liberal, for each state's delegation for the three years before
the election.
PREZ HOME = I if the Democratic candidate is running in their home state, =-1
if the Republican candidate is running in their home state , = 0 if neither candidate
is from their home state.
VP HOME = I if the Democratic vice presidential candidate is running in their
home state , = -I if the Republican vice presidential candidate is running in their
home state , = 0 if neither candidate is from their home state.
SO UTH = I for a Southern state when the Democratic presidential candidate is
from the South, = -I for a Republican candidate running in a Southern state who
is from the South, = 0 when both or neither candidates are from the South, and = 0
for non-Southern states. Southern states are defined by the BLS South Census
region, with the exceptions of Maryland and Delaware.
STATE DUMMIES = I for each state for all the elections in that state. Wyoming
is the base state.
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Appendix D

Coefficients for State Dummies in the Core ModeJ

State

Coefficient

tstatistic

P-value

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

4.482
0.223
3.999
7.162
11.32
5.195
8.743 .
9.717
4 .846
5.467
10.397
-1.883
10.525
4 .373
9.684
2.985
5.736
6.498
8.557
10.589
13.354
8.959
10.857
3.782
7.158

2.19
0.11
2.04
3.44
5.2
2.55
3.82
4.52
2.42
2.7
4.21
-0.97
4.93
2.13
4.64
1.54
2.85
3.25
3.77
4.79
5.23
4.11
4.73
1.79
3.41

0.03
0.91
0.04
0
0
0.01
0
0
0.02
0.01
0
0.33
0
0.03
0
0.13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.08
0

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
PennsyIvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennnessee
Texas

4 .28
-0.774
5.409 ,
5.518
8.138
8.447
12.584
5.124
0.866
7.495
1.636
9.268
9.48
14.774
3.315
4.647
5.591
5.567

2.11
-0.4
2.75
2.81
3.73
4.24
5.55
2.55
0.41
3.64
0.84
4.18
4.48
6.01
1.66
2.35
2.69
2.71

0.04
0.69
0.01
0.01
0
0
0
0.01
0.68
0
0.4
0
0
0
0.1
0.02
0.01
0.01
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Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

-4.503
9.897
4.693
9.161
7 .911

9.565

-2.31
4.34
2.38

0.02

4.13

o
o
o

3.52
4.4

o
0.02

Data

First Section - National Model
For most of the specifications in this section of the paper, Fair's data from his 2004
update was used. Complete descriptions of his methods, and a copy of his data, are
available from his website (Fair 2006).
For the test on the time-horizon of economic voting, however, additional data was needed
to estimate growth rates of real per capita GOP and the inflation rate for off-election
years . To the greatest extent possible, this paper employs Fair's methods and sources, but
in some cases it was necessary to deviate from these . The method is described below.
To construct the growth rate of real per capita GOP, quarterly data on real GOP and
population were needed . To calculate the growth rate of the deflator, data on quarterly
nominal and real GOP were needed.
The data for quarterly GOP from 1947: 1 through the end of the sample were obtained
from the BEA website on December 4 th , 2007. Balke and Gordon (1986), pp. 789-785,
has values for quarterly GOP from 1913: 1 to 2006 :4, and these were used for the paper.
The Balke and Gordon values were spliced to the BEA values. For 1913: 1-1929:4, the
quarterly values are multiplied by the ratio of the BEA value for 1929 to the 1929 annual
value in Balke and Gordon. For 1930: 1-1946:4, a splicing factor for that year was used 
the ratio of the BEA value for that year to the one in Balke and Gordon.
Nominal GOP data came from the same sources and were spliced using the same
methods.
Population data came from two sources. Monthly data on national population from 1952
to the present day were obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) website on December 4 th , 2007. The monthly values for each three month period
were averaged out to give a quarterly estimate. Annual data from 1913 through 1951
came from the US Census Bureau's website. These data were spliced by taking the ratio
of the FRED population value for 1952 to the Census population value for the same year,
and multiplying the Census observations by that value. Quarterly observations prior to
1952 were obtained by interpolating the annual observations using a close variation of the
method presented in Fair (1994), Table 8.6.
GROWTH, GOODNEWS and INFLATION were calculated using the same formulas as
in Fair (2006) .
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Values for the Philadelphia Coincident Index were obtained from the Philadelphia
Federal Reserve Bank's website on November l l'", 2007. Monthly values were averaged
out to get quarterly observations, and annualized rates of growth were constructed using
the same formula that was used for GROWTH. Data on state vote shares were obtained
from Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (November Illh, 2007).

Second Section - State Model
Data for the state forecasting model came from a wide variety of sources.
Data for national personal income is from FRED, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Website.
These were translated into per capita terms by using population data from FRED.
National unemployment also came from here .
State personal income data came from the BEA, and was deflated using regional CPI data
from the BLS. Population data was obtained from US Statistical Abstract, and was used
to convert it into per capita terms. Unemployment data was also obtained from the
statistical abstract.
The trial heat variable was obtained from Gallup poll archives. Ideology is from the
Americans for Democratic Action website.
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